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Democratization and, more recently, the shift towards the choice of 
institutions in newly democratic countries have emerged as two fertile 
arenas for comparative analysis. Central America has captured substantial 
attention from the first perspective, giving rise to important contributions in 
comparative democratization1. However, few studies have applied a 
comparative perspective to the institutional outcomes emerging from 
Central American transitions. Still fewer works have sought to examine 
formal institutional outcomes in Central America in light of existing 
contemporary explanations about institutional choices. 
This paper compares institutional outcomes in El Salvador and 
Guatemala and argues that the modes of transition in these countries 
helped to shape the different institutional outcomes emerging in each of 
them. Two conditions serve initially to support this argument. First, 
Guatemala and El Salvador shared very similar conditions before they 
underwent their processes of transition. Both had political economies 
based largely on labor-repressive institutions, highly unequal societies, and 
military-authoritarian regimes based on an alliance between the military 
and a reactionary economic elite. In spite of these pre-transition similarities, 
their respective transitions produced very different institutional outcomes. 
Second, the outcomes in these countries are quite consistent with the 
expectations about institutional outcomes that the literature associates with 
the different modes of transition. Although both these conditions tend to 
support the argument presented here, this paper is careful not to assume a 
mechanical relationship between the modes of transition and the 
institutional outcomes in both countries. In a closing section, the validity of 
the argument presented is discussed and contrasted with alternative 
explanations accounting for the choice of institutions.   
The outcomes analyzed in this paper include three different 
institutional dimensions: civil-military relations, electoral rules and 
institutional schemes. For each dimension, the paper shows that different 
outcomes emerged in each country according to the modes of transition. In 
the following section I discuss the connections between the modes of 
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transition and the institutional outcomes in both countries. The discussion 
builds on the existing literature about institutional choices to specify the 
connections between modes of transition and institutional outcomes.  
Transition Modes and Institutional Outcomes 
Two characteristics of the transitions in El Salvador and Guatemala 
seem to have had the most significant impact on institutional outcomes. 
The first characteristic refers to the character of the force controlling the 
transition in each country: the military or the civilian forces. The second 
characteristic refers to the relative bargaining power of the incumbents and 
the opposition in the transition. Depending on each side’s relative 
bargaining power, the relationship between incumbents and opposition may 
be balanced, or it may be unbalanced in favor of one side.  
Let us now try to define Guatemala and El Salvador’s transitions 
based on the character of the force controlling the transition –the military or 
the civilians– and on the specific balance between the incumbent and the 
opposition. In both these dimensions, Guatemala and El Salvador show 
important differences. In Guatemala, the military played a dominant role in 
the transition, by deciding the timing of the process, by shaping the rules of 
the transition, and by controlling events at least up to the first democratic 
elections (Arévalo, 1998). In Guatemala, also, incumbent forces enjoyed 
greater bargaining power than the opposition at the negotiation table, 
leaning the balance in favor of the former side. In contrast, in Salvador, 
civilian forces played the dominant role in the transition, by deciding the 
timing of the process and dictating the rules of the transition. In El 
Salvador, also, incumbent and opposition forces both enjoyed some 
bargaining power, making for a more balanced incumbent-opposition 
relationship at the negotiation table2. 
According to Felipe Agüero, two conditions characterizing the initial 
stages of a transition tend to have the greatest impact on civil-military 
outcomes: the force controlling the transition –the military or the civilians– 
and the type of transition3. If the transition is controlled by the military and is 
“from above” –meaning that the incumbents have the power to impose their 
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preferences on the other side– we can expect that the military will enjoy 
greater autonomy in the democratic order and that civil-military relations will 
tend to be unbalanced. The opposite is also true. If the transition is 
controlled by the civilian forces and is “negotiated” –meaning that no party 
has enough bargaining power to impose its preferences on the other– we 
may expect that the military will enjoy less autonomy in the democratic 
order and more balanced civil-military relations will ensue.  
Agüero’s argument is that outcomes in civil-military relations are 
shaped substantially by the initial conditions characterizing transitions. He 
argues that the initial conditions of transitions help to shape the distribution 
of power between the military and the civilian forces in the first post-
authoritarian order. Once a certain distribution of power between the 
military and the civilian forces has been established and institutionalized in 
the first post-authoritarian order, the costs on unsatisfied actors to change it 
increase and thus the possibilities for reversing it decrease. Agüero thus 
relies on the “path dependence” argument to stress the importance of the 
initial conditions in civil-military outcomes4. 
Agüero’s emphasis on the initial conditions structuring transitions 
seems well suited to my cases and becomes a good predictor of civil-
military outcomes in El Salvador and Guatemala. As I will show, the 
military’s dominant position in the first stage of the transition in Guatemala 
helps to explain the military’s greater autonomy in this country, and speaks 
more eloquently to the important continuities that remain with the military-
authoritarian past. In contrast, the military’s much more limited role in the 
Salvadoran transition –due to the United States intervention and a stronger 
military challenge posed by the opposition– helps to explain the military’s 
lower degree of autonomy and the more balanced civil-military relations in 
this country5. 
The specific incumbent-opposition balance characterizing each 
country’s transition seems to be the other powerful variable influencing 
institutional outcomes in each country. In situations in which this 
relationship is unbalanced in favor of the incumbents, as in Guatemala, the 
chances of winding up with majoritarian institutions increase. In contrast, in 
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situations in which the incumbent –opposition relationship is either 
balanced (as in El Salvador) or unbalanced in favor of the opposition, it is 
most likely that pluralist institutions will prevail6. 
Consider the following two situations in which the incumbents 
dominate. In both situations, the incumbents control the process of 
transition but have different electoral expectations. In the first situation, the 
incumbents control the conditions of change, but they are uncertain about 
their electoral chances. In this situation, most authors predict that pluralist 
institutions will emerge because the incumbents will not want to risk losing 
all by choosing majoritarian institutions. 
In the second situation, the incumbents are powerful enough to 
impose the conditions of change and their preferences on other side and 
they are optimistic about their electoral chances. In this situation, it is 
almost certain that majoritarian institutions will prevail because 1) based on 
their electoral expectations, the incumbents will tend to prefer majoritarian 
to pluralist institutions, and 2) they will have the power to impose this result 
on the opposition7. This scenario does not assume, however, that the 
incumbents are necessarily right about their electoral expectations. In fact, 
the incumbents might be utterly wrong in the electoral calculus and, based 
on their erroneous beliefs, still choose majoritarian institutions. Some 
factors tend to increase the possibility of error in the electoral calculus. For 
example, these probabilities tend to increase if no previous democratic 
election has taken place before the choice of the institutions. The timing of 
the first election also may affect the incumbents’ electoral expectations. In 
general, the closest the first election is to the moment of the transfer of 
power, the likelier it is that the incumbents will overestimate their electoral 
chances. In Guatemala, as I will discuss later, both the results of the first 
election and the timing of the second election led the incumbent parties to 
overestimate their electoral chances.    
Now consider a scenario in which the bargaining power of the 
incumbents and the opposition is relatively well balanced and no side is in 
a position to impose its preferences on the other. From this scenario, two 
situations may arise. In the first situation, no side is certain about its 
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electoral chances, and both prefer pluralist institutions as a way of 
minimizing the risk of losing all and of maximizing the possibility of gaining 
some representation. In the second situation, at least one side is optimistic 
about its electoral chances but, because it cannot impose its preferences 
on the other side, both must compromise on a “mixed” formula that may not 
be purely pluralist but also may not be purely majoritarian.    
The chances of winding up with pluralist institutions are even greater. 
For example, in situations in which the opposition rather than the 
incumbents control the transition, we also can expect pluralist institutions. 
The underlying logic for this, as evidenced in the Eastern European 
transitions, is that the opposition prefers pluralist institutions because it 
anticipates that it will split after the transition and therefore tries to 
maximize the chances of the different factions8. 
From this discussion, two conclusions follow. The first is that 
majoritarian institutions tend to flourish under narrower conditions than 
pluralist institutions, which are likely to emerge in a broader range of 
situations. The second is that only in situations in which the incumbents 
control the process of transition, as was the case in Guatemala and not in 
El Salvador, do majoritarian institutions have any chance to prosper. In all 
other situations, pluralist institutions are more likely to be the outcome.  
On the basis of this discussion, I may have the following expectations 
regarding institutional outcomes in Guatemala and El Salvador. In 
Guatemala, where the transition was controlled by the military and 
dominated by the incumbents, I should expect the military to enjoy greater 
autonomy, civil-military relations to be more unbalanced, and political 
institutions to be more majoritarian. In El Salvador, where the civilian forces 
played a more important role in the process and the transition was 
negotiated, I should expect the military to enjoy less autonomy, civil-military 
relations to be more balanced, and political institutions to be more 
pluralistic. 
Defining the Dependent Variables 
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This paper attempts to link transition modes with institutional outcomes 
in two different dimensions: civil-military relations and formal political 
institutions. In this sense, the paper considers two sets of variables. The 
first set is related to the first dimension, civil-military relations. The second 
set, which is related to the second dimension, is composed in turn of two 
subsets of variables: electoral rules and institutional schemes.  
The first set of variables that this paper takes into account includes 
three different aspects of civil-military relations: a) military reform; b) civilian 
control; and c) military presence in the political life. Both the first and the 
third aspects should inform us about the military’s institutional and political 
autonomy in the new democratic order, helping us to identify the 
continuities or discontinuities with the military-authoritarian past. The 
second aspect should help us to measure how balanced civil-military 
relations are in both countries. This paper will use a variety of indicators to 
measure the three aspects. For the first aspect, the indicators are military 
cuts, evolution of the military budget as a percentage of GDP and central 
government spending, the military reform in light of the peace accords, etc. 
For the second aspect, certain provisions included in the peace accords to 
ensure civilian supervision of the military, such as the creation of a 
legislative commission to control state intelligence activities in Guatemala, 
will be looked at. To measure the last aspect, I will consider the number of 
military or former military officials occupying public office, the military’s 
situation regarding human rights violations, and the persistence of military 
structures linked to the authoritarian past.    
The second set of variables includes two different political institutions: 
electoral rules and institutional schemes. I compare electoral rules in the 
two countries for the presidency, the legislatures and the municipalities. 
Although all these rules are taken into account, I focus on the rules 
governing the election of the legislatures where the most important 
differences are found. With regard to the institutional schemes, no 
differences are found in their main constitutional features. Both share one 
institution (presidentialism) that favors the division of powers, and two 
institutions (a unicameral legislature and a centralized state) that are more 
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majoritarian. Thus, to measure the pluralist or majoritarian character of 
these countries’ institutional schemes, I focus on less formal institutional 
provisions that tend to increase or decrease the chances of divided 
government and power-sharing. These institutional mechanisms or 
provisions are the following: the concurrency or non-concurrency elections, 
at both the horizontal and the vertical level and the areas of power-sharing, 
specially regarding the appointments to relevant institutions.    
Institutional Outcomes 
Civil-Military Relations 
According to the relationship specified in the previous section, I should 
expect the following outcomes in civil-military relations. In Guatemala, 
given a military-led and “from above” transition, I should expect greater 
autonomy of the military and more unbalanced civil-military relations. In El 
Salvador, given a civilian-led and negotiated transition, I should expect 
lesser autonomy and more balanced civil-military-relations.  
The peace accords provide the necessary point of departure to 
analyze civil-military outcomes in both countries because they redefine the 
role of the military and reshape civil-military relations in a democratic order. 
The agreements in both countries define a new role for the Armed Forces 
limited to external defense functions and affirm civilian supremacy over the 
military. In addition, similar reforms are envisioned to achieve these goals. 
First, the accords include a military reform that contains similar aspects, 
such as the formulation of a new military doctrine, a redeployment 
consistent with external defense, education reform and military reduction. 
Second, they establish the return of public security functions to civilian 
control by eliminating the old repressive and paramilitary organizations, 
turning over intelligence activities to civilian control, and creating a new 
civilian police dependent no longer on the Ministry of Defense but on a 
civilian Ministry of Governance. To ensure civilian control of the military, the 
accords also establish certain mechanisms to ensure legislative oversight 
of the Armed Forces.   
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Despite the similarities, the accords show some differences in 
important areas affecting the institutional and political autonomy of the 
military. These key areas, affecting “core” interests of the military, are 
education and human rights violations. In both these areas, the Salvadoran 
agreements go much further than the Guatemalan accords, reflecting the 
differences in the relative power of both countries’ militaries. For example, 
in the area of education, the Guatemalan accords recognize the necessity 
of reforming the military’s educational system to make it consistent with the 
new democratic values, but they do not specify concrete mechanisms to 
achieve this goal. In contrast, in El Salvador, the accords explicitly assign 
civilians a role in the education of the military by creating a mixed 
Academic Council as the ruling body of the Military School, charged, 
among other things, with supervising the academic curriculum of the 
School.  
The other important area in which the agreements differ affects the 
assessment of the military’s role in human rights violations. Given this 
issue’s centrality in most transitions from military rule in Latin America and 
its definition as a “core” interest of the military, the outcome in this area is 
even more revealing of the military’s relative bargaining power in both 
countries. In this area, the military in Guatemala was able to maintain 
important prerogatives, while the military in El Salvador was not. In both 
countries, the agreements created special commissions9 to investigate the 
truth about human rights violations during the war, but with very different 
consequences in each country. In Guatemala, none of these commissions 
was given the political mandate to investigate the role of the institution in 
human rights violations or the behavior of individual military members in 
these episodes. In contrast, in El Salvador, the Ad-Hoc Commission was 
specifically assigned the role to assess and evaluate the behavior of 
individual military members, including high-ranking officials, in episodes of 
human rights violations during the war and to issue recommendations on 
the basis of these evaluations.   
The political consequences of this provision in El Salvador were not 
minor. As a result of the Ad-Hoc Commission’s work, and on the basis of its 
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recommendations, 103 military officers were purged from the institutions by 
the end of 1993. Although the government long resisted this measure, the 
pressures of the international community forced the Cristiani government 
finally to act on the Commission’s recommendations and dismiss the 103 
officers by 1993. The purges had an even greater impact in that they 
reached the highest level of the institution, affecting high-ranking officers 
such as the former Minister of Defense, Rene Emilio Ponce, and the Vice 
Minister of Defense, Juan Orlando Zepeda.   
In Guatemala, in contrast, the military has managed to escape political 
accusations of human rights violations both collectively and individually. 
The military’s continuing influence in this area is illustrated in the fact that 
the Report on the Reconstruction of the Historical Memory (REMHI) and 
the revelations of the Commission for the Historical Learning (CEH) had no 
political consequences for the institution and its individual members. More 
specifically, the power and influence of the Guatemalan military is shown in 
the fact that it continues to resort to the same practices of the past to divert 
political accusations and block judicial investigations of military members in 
connection with human rights violations. These practices, which consist of 
“threats” and intimidation tactics combined with disinformation campaigns, 
as used in the well-known cases of Mack and Gerardi’s assassination, 
show that the military continues to maintain a powerful network based both 
on connections within the Judiciary and on its continuing active role in 
intelligence activities.  
Other aspects show the continuing influence of the military in 
Guatemala’s new order and the important continuities with its military past. 
First, the Constitution has not yet been reformed to embrace the new civil-
military relations. This not only is revealing of the strength that the old 
forces continue to have, but also hinders the overall transformation of these 
relations. The unreformed Constitution creates an institutional anomaly 
whereby the peace accords define the new civil-military relations, while the 
Constitution still reflects the old order. This discrepancy already has 
become an obstacle for the normalization of civil-military relations. It has 
prevented the new government from appointing a civilian as the new 
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Minister of Defense at the beginning of its administration. The executive’s 
intention to appoint a civilian as the new Minister of Defense was soon 
blocked by the Constitutional Court when it declared the appointment 
unconstitutional. The failure to pass the constitutional reforms, in May of 
1999, also has hindered all progress in the area of civilian control over the 
military by delaying the creation of a legislative commission encharged of 
controlling state intelligence activities.   
Second, the military body officially responsible for protecting and 
assisting the president and involved for decades in intelligence and illegal 
activities –the so-called Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP)– has not yet 
been dismantled. The resilience of the EMP hinders the normalization of 
civil-military relations in important ways. First, it helps to maintain the 
influence of individual military elements in the country’s political life. 
Despite not having organic links to the military, the militarized EMP always 
has worked as a platform for individual military officers, generally linked to 
the military intelligence, to access and influence the president’s decisions. 
Not only did this not change, but it intensified with the rise of civilian 
presidents10. Second, the existence of the EMP continues to give members 
of the military an active role in intelligence activities in direct violation not 
only of the peace accords but also of the separation of powers and the rule 
of law11. In addition, the military’s continuing role in intelligence activities is 
tightly linked to the surge in organized crime in post-war Guatemala –
including, bank robberies, car thefts, kidnappings and drug trafficking– and 
thus it is at the heart of the Guatemala’s enormous security problems. 
In contrast, in El Salvador, the Constitution has been changed to 
include the new civil-military relations, intelligence activities successfully 
have been returned to civilian control, and the military virtually has 
vanished from public life.  
These pieces of evidence demonstrate that the military in Guatemala 
enjoys greater autonomy and prerogatives than the military in El Salvador. 
As a result, civil-military relations in Guatemala tend to be more 
unbalanced than in El Salvador. By this I do not mean to say that civil-
military relations are completely normalized in El Salvador or that no 
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progress has been achieved in Guatemala concerning these relations. In 
the following section I compare civil-military outcomes in a more systematic 
fashion, according to the three dimensions mentioned earlier: military 
reform, civilian control and military presence in public life.  
Comparing civil-military relations 
If I compare civil-military relations in El Salvador and Guatemala 
according to these dimensions –military reform, civilian control and military 
presence in public life– I find that Guatemala has made some progress in 
the area of military reform, while it lags in the areas of civilian control and 
military presence in public life. In contrast, El Salvador ranks much better in 
the area of military presence in public life, has done similarly equally well in 
the area of military reform, and shares problems with Guatemala in the 
area of civilian control. 
The most important advances in both countries are found in the area 
of military reform (or military conversion). In both countries, the new role 
assigned to the military in a democratic society has been accompanied by 
efforts to create a new military doctrine consistent with this role12. In both 
countries, the military has undertaken this effort in collaboration with 
civilians. The process of military reform also has included severe 
reductions in troop size in the two countries. The reductions have been 
more drastic in El Salvador than in Guatemala, but the Armed Forces in El 
Salvador also were larger than their Guatemalan counterparts, both in 
absolute numbers and in the number of troops per 1,000 persons13. In both 
countries, the reductions have been accompanied by a territorial 
redeployment of the military consistent with external defense needs rather 
than more traditional internal security concerns such as population control. 
Although this process has been completed in El Salvador, it is still 
underway in Guatemala. In an interview with an official working in the UN 
mission for the verification of the peace accords in Guatemala (MINUGUA), 
he describes the military’s process of territorial redeployment as quite 
successful, with two notable exceptions. The military has resisted 
abandoning the old conflictive triangle of Ixil arguing that the people do not 
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want them to leave the territory for security purposes, and for the moment it 
continues to maintain a territorial presence in the area for the alleged 
purpose of population control. In addition, until very recently the civilian 
units of the regional military divisions were still engaging in intelligence 
activities14. Finally, as part of the process of military reform, the military 
budget has been reduced as a percentage of total central government 
spending and as a percentage of GDP. In the case of El Salvador, the 
military budget has been reduced to 5 percent of total government 
expenditures, down from 7 percent. In the case of Guatemala, the cuts in 
the military budget have been less sensitive, although this is due to the 
specific timing established in the peace accords.  
In contrast to the relative successes achieved in the area of military 
reform (or military conversion), the two countries have made the least 
progress in the areas of civilian control and supervision of the military. 
Antonio Martinez-Uribe, a Salvadoran scholar who specializes in military 
issues, argues that no effective civilian control of the military exists in El 
Salvador, primarily because i) no national security or defense policy has 
been formulated; ii) the National Security Council created in September 
1993 is not working properly; iii) there is no effective control of the military 
budget process; and iv) the Modernization Plan of the Armed Forces, 
known as Arce 2000, was created exclusively by the military. Martinez-
Uribe also tends to attribute the slow progress in this key area of civil-
military relations to the neglect and inaction of the civilian forces with 
respect to military issues. In Guatemala, the most elemental mechanisms 
needed to facilitate and enforce civilian control of the military –such as the 
creation of a legislative commission to ensure civilian control of intelligence 
operations– have not yet been established; in fact, they were rejected as 
part of a package of constitutional reforms in the popular consultation of 
May 1999. The lack of civilian control over the Guatemalan military is even 
more problematic because of the military’s continuing role in intelligence 
activities and its presence in the country’s public life. 
The differences between the two countries are especially visible in the 
degree to which the military remains involved in public life. In El Salvador, 
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the military has all but vanished from the country’s political and public life 
over the past eight years. In the years immediately following the peace 
accords, the military had an interest in lowering its public and political 
profile for fear of becoming the object of further purges and political attacks. 
But over the past few years the military has complained that is being 
neglected by civilian politicians15. As Martínez-Uribe suggests, the scant 
progress made in asserting civilian control over the military is probably due 
to a lack of interest on the part of the civilians in military affairs. While weak 
civilian control over the military does not contribute to healthy civil-military 
relations, the underlying reason for it –civilian neglect– also could suggest 
that El Salvador has left its military past behind.  
The same cannot be said about Guatemala. The country’s military 
past continues to have a highly visible presence in public life despite the 
military’s internal efforts to adopt a professional profile. The continuing 
vitality of the military’s public role is manifested at different levels. First, 
certain structures tightly linked to Guatemala’s repressive military past –the 
EMP, for example– have not yet been dismantled. Although, the EMP is an 
autonomous institution whose links to the military exist only on an individual 
level, it continues to function as a platform for individual military officials to 
influence the country’s political life. In addition, the EMP allows military 
elements to continue to be engaged in intelligence activities. The powerful 
role that this institution continues to play in blocking investigations involving 
military members repeatedly has been illustrated in internationally 
publicized cases such as Gerardi and Myrna Mack’s assassinations, 
among others. Second, many former military officials in Guatemala occupy 
prominent public office’s positions. To cite only the two most visible and 
striking examples, the presidency of the legislature is occupied by General 
and former president Rios Montt, and the chief of the Ministry of Public 
Security, Byron Barrientos, is a former military officer with links to military 
intelligence. Third, it is no secret that the old ex-civilian patrol structures are 
making a comeback in certain communities of the western highland and 
that some of these old military structures are behind the “linchamientos” 
that the United Nations Mission has been reporting over the past few years. 
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Finally, the military’s past continues to live, institutionalized and frozen, in a 
Constitution that has not been reformed following the negative results of 
the popular consultation in May 1999. 
Electoral rules 
In this area, given the modes of transition, I should expect El Salvador 
to have more inclusive electoral rules than Guatemala. Regarding the rules 
for the presidential election, no differences are found between the two 
countries. The rule that both countries use to elect president is the double-
ballot, meaning that if no candidate obtains an absolute majority of the vote 
in the first round, the election is decided in a second round between the two 
highest vote-getters. Considering the intrinsic exclusionary nature of a 
presidential election –in that it allows only one winner, and the winner is not 
even one party but one person– this is considered to be the most inclusive 
rule, since it includes the median voter. Regarding the rules governing local 
elections, no significant differences are found between the two countries. El 
Salvador has a plurality system, while Guatemala has a quasi plurality 
system16. 
The most important differences between the two countries are found in 
the rules governing legislative elections. As I shall show, certain elements 
of the electoral system –such as, the electoral formula used to allocate 
seats in the assembly, the size of the smallest district, and the average 
district magnitude for the lower districts– vary between the two countries to 
produce more or less proportional effects. 
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Electoral Systems of Guatemala and El Salvador 
 Tier Electoral Smallest District Number of Assembly Legal Effective 
  Formula District Magnitude districts size Threshold Threshold 
GUA H d’Hondt  22 1 113 NO 3.2 
 L d’Hondt 1.2 (9) 3.9 23 
    
ES H LR- Hare   20 1 84 NO 3.5 
 L LR-Hare 3 (8) 4.5 14 
Source: Based on Arend Lijphart: Electoral Systems and Party Systems, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1994 
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In Guatemala, the combination of the d’Hondt formula –the least 
proportional of the PR formulas–, the size of the smallest district (1), and 
the large number of small districts (9) with a size of 1 and 2, gives the 
system a strong majoritarian bias17. This bias can be illustrated in the 
following figures: The electoral system in Guatemala has created a one-
party winner in three out of four elections; that is, in 75 percent of the 
elections, the electoral system has produced an absolute winner in the 
assembly. In all of these elections, except in the last one, the electoral 
system has manufactured a party majority, increasing by almost 15 (in 
1986) and 20 points (in 1995) the difference between the first party’s vote 
share and seat share. In contrast, the electoral system has worked to the 
disadvantage of second and third parties, which always have seen their 
seat share with regard to their vote share reduced. This disproportionality is 
only partially compensated by the existence of a national district, since the 
national district allocates only 1/4 of the seats in the assembly, while the 
other 3/4 are allocated through the lower districts. Despite this, the 
existence of a national district reduces the effective threshold allowing a 
party to obtain representation with a relatively low percentage of votes 3.2. 
In turn, this may help to explain why, despite the majoritarian effects of the 
Guatemalan electoral system, a large number of parties (larger than in El 
Salvador) obtain some representation in the assembly18. 
In contrast, in El Salvador, the combination of the LR-Hare formula –
the most proportional of the PR formulas– and the size and number of the 
smallest districts tends to produce more proportional effects. This is easily 
illustrated by looking to the few times that the electoral system has 
produced a one-party majority (in only 2 out of 7 elections). Thus, the 
electoral system in El Salvador has produced an absolute winner in the 
assembly in only 28 percent of the elections. Moreover, in the only two 
occasions that the electoral system produced a one-party majority in the 
legislature (in 1985 and 1988), the size of the assembly was extremely 
reduced (60) and a higher district that allocates 1/3 of the seats in the 
assembly had not yet been introduced. Since the number of 
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representatives in the assembly increased (from 60 to 84) and the national 
district was introduced in 1991, the electoral system has not again 
produced a single-party majority in the assembly. The greater 
proportionality of the Salvadoran electoral system, however, does not affect 
as much the number of effective parties in the assembly (lower than in 
Guatemala) as it affects the vote/seat distribution among the three largest 
parties. Compared to Guatemala, in El Salvador, the largest deviation 
produced by the electoral system for the largest party has never exceeded 
2.1 points and for other parties it has never been superior, as an average, 
to 5.2 points. Thus, the more proportional effects of the Salvadoran 
electoral system can be observed in smaller deviations in seat shares as 
regards to vote shares affecting the largest parties. Moreover, the system 
tends to benefit slightly the third party over the second, and the second 
over the first. For example, in five out of seven elections, the third party 
was rewarded with a greater share in seats than its vote share, compared 
to only three times in which the second and first party obtained a slightly 
higher seat share than their vote share. This slight deviation in the 
proportionality favoring the third party can be explained as a result of 
applying the LR-Hare formula in a high number of districts (more than half 
or 53 percent) with the minimum size of three seats.  
The greater proportionality of the Salvadoran electoral system helps to 
explain why, almost from the first democratic elections of 1982, multiparty 
agreements and coalitions dominated the dynamics of the legislature in El 
Salvador. In turn, the effects of multiparty negotiations in the assembly 
have been to produce intermediate and more moderate agreements that 
have satisfied the preferences of a greater number of voters. 
Institutional Schemes19 
El Salvador and Guatemala appear to have similar institutional 
schemes. They both are presidential systems with a unicameral parliament 
and a centralized state. However, when viewed more closely, important 
elements of their institutional schemes are different. More importantly, 
these differences seem to be crucial in explaining the more or less 
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pluralistic effects of their institutional schemes. Political pluralism exists 
when different parties control relevant institutions and have an opportunity 
to participate in the decisions. Thus, a particular institutional scheme is 
more pluralistic if it increases the chances of different parties controlling 
different relevant institutions. Conversely, an institutional scheme is less 
pluralistic if it increases the chances of only one party controlling all the 
relevant institutions.  
Pluralism, or divided government, has both a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension. In presidential systems, horizontal pluralism or horizontally 
divided government refers to a situation in which different majorities control 
different branches of power, mainly the executive and legislative branches. 
This, in turn, is highly dependent on whether the elections for the different 
government offices are concurrent or not, and on the particular balance of 
power between the executive and the legislative or, in other words, on the 
degree of power-sharing. Similarly, vertical pluralism or vertically divided 
government refers to a situation in which different parties control different 
levels of government, mainly the central and regional or local levels. Like 
horizontally divided government, vertically divided government depends on 
whether elections for the central offices and for the regional ones are 
concurrent or not, and on the degree of federalism and decentralization of 
power. 
Based on the previous discussion, in the following paragraphs I look at 
institutional schemes in El Salvador and Guatemala. If my argument is 
correct, I should expect El Salvador, where the transition was negotiated, to 
have more pluralistic institutions at both the horizontal and the vertical 
levels. Conversely, I should expect Guatemala, where the transition was 
“from above”, to have more restrictive and majoritarian institutions at both 
the horizontal and the vertical level. To discern this, I look to the following 
elements. At the horizontal level, I discuss a) the concurrency or non-
concurrency of presidential and legislative elections and b) certain areas of 
power-sharing between the two branches of government. At the vertical 
level, I look to a) the concurrency or non-concurrency of central and local 
elections and b) the formal division of power at the vertical level. 
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Horizontal Institutional Schemes  
Concurrent and Non-Concurrent Elections. Concurrent or non-
concurrent elections tend to have a strong impact on horizontal pluralism, 
increasing or decreasing the chances of divided government, by influencing 
the parties’ and the voters’ strategies. In general, non-concurrent elections 
increase the chances of divided government by allowing the parties to run 
on different issues for the different government offices, creating incentives 
for a sincerely divided vote, and by making strategic divided vote safer for 
voters. By contrast, concurrent elections increase the chances of unified 
government by inducing parties to run on the same issues for the different 
offices, inducing a concentrated vote and making strategic divided vote 
more risky for voters20. 
Voting patterns and outcomes in El Salvador and Guatemala tend to 
support this evidence. In Guatemala, where elections for the different 
branches and levels of government are concurrent, only one of four 
elections produced a divided government. In the other three elections (that 
is, in 75 percent of the cases), the president’s party won a majority in the 
assembly. In Guatemala, in the first two democratic elections, an additional 
institutional device tended to increase the chances of a unified government. 
Both the presidential candidates and the representatives from the national 
list were elected in a single ballot, precluding any possibility of splitting the 
vote among them. This device was eliminated with the constitutional 
reforms of 1994, and thus it has not been in place in the last two elections.  
In El Salvador, in contrast, non-concurrent elections for the different 
branches of government progressively have created a pattern of divided 
vote and divided government. Divided government has been a more 
frequent outcome as the number of parties competing in the elections and 
holding different positions regarding the different issues have increased. In 
this sense, the 1994 elections, the first elections in which the leftist FMLN 
competed, can be taken as a turning point. Before these elections, unified 
government was the outcome in 100 percent of the cases, while after these 
elections divided government has become the dominant tendency. In the 
legislative elections of 1997, the president’s party (ARENA) saw its majority 
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in the assembly significantly reduced, from 39 to 28 seats out of a total of 
84 (in percentage terms, from 46.4 to 33.3 percent of all seats). In the 
same elections, the main opposition party saw its minority position increase 
from 21 to 27 seats (in percentage terms, from 25 to 32.1 percent). In the 
legislative elections of 2000, the president’s party (ARENA) lost its majority 
in the assembly to the main opposition party, the FMLN. Currently, the 
FMLN holds a plurality in the assembly with 31 seats (a 37 percent share) 
against the president’s party, ARENA, which has 29 seats (a 34.5 percent 
share). 
Power-Sharing. The pluralistic effects of divided government can be 
greatly enhanced when power-sharing prevails in a large number of areas. 
In general, when power-sharing prevails in a large number of areas 
relations tend to be more cooperative and decisions more plural since they 
are necessarily the result of an intermediate agreement. 
In particular, the pluralistic effects of power-sharing in El Salvador and 
Guatemala can be seen in an area that the executive and legislative 
powers in a presidential system traditionally share: the appointments to 
several relevant institutions. Power-sharing in this area can be achieved by 
having different institutions concurring to appoint different positions to 
relevant institutions or, as in El Salvador, by having the assembly elect 
most positions by a qualified majority, since the later necessarily entails 
negotiations and some degree compromise among the political parties in 
the assembly. Power-sharing in this area enhances pluralism by promoting 
cooperative relations between the different branches of government and by 
producing intermediate and more moderate candidates.  
Democratization in El Salvador and Guatemala provided an 
opportunity to redefine the area of power-sharing for institutional 
appointments as new institutions were created and old ones were 
reformed. Consistent with the modes of transition, power-sharing in this 
area is larger in El Salvador than in Guatemala. In El Salvador, as I already 
mentioned, power-sharing is achieved by imposing a qualified majority (2/3) 
in the assembly to elect the positions to most institutions that were created 
or reformed in the peace accords21. This qualified majority has forced the 
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political parties in the assembly to engage in negotiations and achieve 
some degree of compromise in order to elect the candidates. In contrast, in 
Guatemala, fewer positions are appointed by the Congress and by no 
qualified majority and many more are left to the presidency to decide 
unilaterally22. 
As a result, in Guatemala the number of institutions controlled by the 
president’s party is much larger than in El Salvador. If I add the fact that 
unified government tends to prevail in Guatemala as a result of concurrent 
elections, I must conclude that the president’s party controls almost all 
relevant institutions. In contrast, in El Salvador, as a result of non-
concurrent elections and power-sharing, a much more pluralistic picture 
emerges. Not only is the government divided in El Salvador, with the right 
controlling the presidency and the left controlling the assembly, but, as a 
result of power-sharing mechanisms promoting cooperative relations, 
pluralism is extended to other important institutions, such as the Supreme 
Court and the Human Rights’ Office.     
Vertical Institutional Schemes 
Concurrent versus Non-Concurrent Elections. Pluralism has not only a 
horizontal but a vertical dimension as well. Vertical pluralism or vertically 
divided government can be measured by the proportion of regional and 
local executives whose party is not in the national government. This 
proportion tends to be lower when national and regional or local elections 
are concurrent. Conversely, it tends to be higher when central and local 
elections are non-concurrent.  
In Guatemala, where elections for the national and local governments 
are concurrent23, the party that wins the presidency also tends to win a high 
number of municipal elections. The president’s party has won an 
overwhelming majority of local governments in all elections except for the 
first democratic election (in which the national and local elections were non-
concurrent) and the 1990 election (in which the president’s party did not 
win a majority in the assembly). In 1995, the party that won the presidency 
and a majority in the assembly, the PAN, also won a majority (50 percent) 
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of the municipalities, followed by the second largest party. In the last 
elections, in 1999, the local map shifted as a different party, the FRG, won 
the national government (both the presidency and the legislative) and a 
majority of the municipalities (153 municipalities or 48 percent). With the 
number of the municipalities (108) and the percentage (32 percent) 
obtained by the second largest party –the PAN– in these elections, the two 
largest parties controlled an 80 per cent of the local governments.   
In El Salvador, between 1985 and 1997, the president’s party also 
controlled most local governments. However, this pattern has been shifting 
towards a more pluralistic scenario, as divided government has been 
established at the national level. As the tendency to vote for different 
parties at the horizontal level has increased, this tendency also has been 
reflected at the local level. One reason for this is that elections for the 
legislature and for the municipalities are concurrent, while both are non-
concurrent with the presidential election. The power that the FMLN has 
acquired at the national level by winning the majority in the assembly is 
mirrored by an even larger proportion of local units in control of the party. In 
the last elections, the FMLN won 26 more local governments. While the 
president’s party, ARENA, still controls 126 municipalities, the FMLN has 
increased the number of municipalities under its control from 54 to 80. 
More importantly, since the FMLN controls the local governments in 8 out 
of the 14 departmental capitals that include the largest municipalities in 
terms of population, more people are governed by the FMLN at the local 
level than by ARENA.  
A Centralized versus a Decentralized State. El Salvador and 
Guatemala are both unitary states with Constitutions that recognize local 
autonomy and thus different levels of government. In practice, though, they 
are not only unitary but also centralized states. The unitary character of the 
state is eloquently reflected at the regional level. The two countries are 
divided into several regional units or departments (22 in Guatemala and 14 
in El Salvador). But these units serve only as administrative divisions of the 
state, with no separate powers or even the administrative capacity to carry 
out policy. Nevertheless, in both countries, a governor is appointed by the 
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president to represent each regional department. The unitary character of 
the state, and the lack of intermediate units with separate powers, might 
explain the absence of a second chamber.  
Despite the unitary character of the state, the existence of local 
governments permits measurement, at least to some extent, of the degree 
of decentralization in each country. From a constitutional and legal 
framework, there are no significant differences between El Salvador and 
Guatemala with regard to the degree of autonomy of their local 
governments. In general, despite a constitutional principle recognizing 
municipal autonomy, local governments have little or no autonomy. The 
lack of autonomy is illustrated best by the fiscal limitations affecting the 
local governments. The municipalities do not even have ultimate decision-
making power concerning local taxes and tax rates. As a positive sign, the 
constitution in Guatemala and a law in El Salvador guarantee that 10 
percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the national budget must go to the 
municipalities. But again, these funds are managed and distributed by 
several central government institutions instead of being directly transferred 
to the municipalities.  
In spite of these similarities, trends in each country regarding 
decentralization processes already show some differences as a result of 
more or less favorable national conditions. In Guatemala, where the 
president’s party controls all the institutions at the national level (despite 
recent talks about decentralization), the tendency in practice has been to 
concentrate more power by trying to extend one-party control to the local 
level. From the beginning of this administration, many municipalities 
(among them, Ixcan and the largest municipality in the country, Guatemala 
City) have complained that the central government discriminates against 
the local units controlled by different parties. In El Salvador, in contrast, 
divided government at the national level –that is, different parties having 
power in relevant institutions at the national level– not only has been 
mirrored by increasing political diversity at the local level, but also has 
worked to the advantage of these local units. Recent progress in 
decentralization and local autonomy, which includes the legislation granting 
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6 percent of the national budget to local governments, has been achieved 
under conditions of divided government at the national level24. 
How Much do Transition Modes Explain? 
Of all the institutional outcomes considered here, at least two of four in 
El Salvador and one of four25 in Guatemala, respectively, were the direct 
outcome of the peace negotiations. The one outcome in both countries that 
directly emerged from the peace accords concerns civil-military relations. In 
this area, the outcomes clearly reflect the differences in the relative 
bargaining power of the military and the opposition in both countries. In 
Guatemala, where the military retained strong bargaining power –due in 
part to its initially dominant role in the transition and to the fact that it 
defeated militarily the opposition– the outcome was greater political and 
institutional autonomy for the military and more unbalanced civil-military 
relations. In El Salvador, where the military’s bargaining power was weaker 
due to its strong dependence on the US aid and a much stronger 
opposition, the outcome was further limitations on its political and 
institutional autonomy and more balanced civil-military relations.  
The other institutional outcome that emerged from the peace accords 
in El Salvador, and from the 1985 Constitution in Guatemala, concerns the 
area of power-sharing in executive/legislative relations, and more 
specifically the role of these branches of government in appointing 
positions to new institutions such as the Constitutional Court (in Guatemala 
only), the Supreme Court, the Electoral Court, the Human Right’s Office, 
the Attorney General and the Contralor. The differences that have been 
pointed out in this area between both countries might well reflect the 
asymmetry concerning the point in time along the transition in which these 
new institutions were shaped. Despite important differences in the relative 
bargaining power of the incumbents in each transition, in both countries the 
relative bargaining power of the incumbents was at its most at an early 
stage of the process. In Guatemala, where the incumbents’ bargaining 
power was always stronger, most of these institutions emerged from the 
1985 Constitution, that is, at the earliest stage of the transition when the 
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incumbents relative bargaining power was most powerful. In contrast, in El 
Salvador, most of these institutions were either reformed or created in the 
peace accords reflecting the much more balanced bargaining power 
between the incumbents and the opposition. 
The basic rules of the electoral system were chosen in both countries 
at an early stage of the process rather than at the final stage of the peace 
accords26. This helps to explain certain characteristics of the electoral 
systems, since as I have already mentioned at an early stage of the 
process regime elites played a much more decisive role in the transitions of 
both countries than at any later stage of the process. For example, the fact 
that these rules were shaped at an early stage of the process when regime 
elites were most powerful might explain the continuities of certain elements 
in the electoral systems of both countries, such as the electoral formula and 
the average district magnitude, with regard to the rules prevailing in the 
authoritarian regime27. This means that some of the fundamental 
differences affecting the proportionality and the degree of inclusiveness of 
the electoral rules in both countries (such as the electoral formula and the 
average magnitude of the lower districts) trace back to choices made under 
authoritarian rule. Overall, however, the changes that were introduced 
during the process of democratization (such as the introduction of a 
national district and an increase in the size of the assembly) increased the 
proportionality of both electoral systems bringing down the effective 
threshold from an average of 12 to 14 to an average of 3.2 to 3.5 per cent 
approximately. 
Finally, with the exception of certain areas of the executive and 
legislative powers, the choice of institutional schemes also shows much 
continuity with regard to the schemes prevailing under the authoritarian 
regime. This is not only the case with presidentialism, centralism and 
unicameralism, but more specifically with the one institutional device that 
has been stressed here, such as the concurrency or non-concurrency of 
the elections, which traces back to choices made under authoritarian rule28. 
From the previous discussion I may conclude that at least half (two out 
of four) of the institutional outcomes considered here, mainly civil-military 
 27
relations and power-sharing in executive/legislative relations, were directly 
the result of the transitions; one institutional dimension, mainly the 
institutional schemes, was the result of continuity; and one last outcome, 
the electoral rules, combined both some continuity and change in the 
essential elements making up the electoral system.  
If I divide the elements of the electoral systems in two groups, one 
composed of the elements that suffered some change –such as, the size of 
the assembly and the effective threshold through the introduction of a 
national district– and the other by those that did not change –such as the 
electoral formula and the size of the lowest districts–, I have that two out of 




Institutional Outcomes in Guatemala and El Salvador 
 Civil-Military  
 Institutional Schemes Electoral System 
 Military Civil-military Electoral Smallest Higher Assembly  Power- 
 autonomy relations Formula District District size Elections sharing 
GUA High Unbalanced d’Hondt 1 22 (1/4) 113 Concurrent Low  
EL Low Balanced LR-Hare 3 20 (1/3) 84 Non-concurrent High 
Source: Author 
 
Thus, the question is what accounts for this continuity in the choice of 
institutions? Noting that the institutions in Latin America exhibit more 
continuity with previous models than Eastern Europe, Geddes suggests the 
following explanation. In Latin America, in contrast to Eastern Europe, the 
rise of military dictatorships did not suppose the outlawing and annihilation 
of the old parties and structures; these parties and structures continued to 
live underground during the authoritarian regimes. As a result, “when the 
dictatorship, in preparing to relinquish power, allows the reemergence of 
parties, the old parties still have essentially the same interest they had 
before, and they represent the same societal groups and benefit from the 
same features of the institutional environment; thus they have little to gain 
from making risky changes in political rules”29. 
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This argument applies to Central America with some clarifications. In 
Central America, in contrast to the countries that Geddes has in mind and 
which experienced re-democratization, the few competitive institutions and 
structures that managed to survive after the transition were shaped not in 
previous democratic periods but, paradoxically, under the long-lasting 
authoritarian regimes. Since the long-lasting authoritarian regimes of 
Central America combined repressive institutions and strategies with some 
degree of pluralism and political contestation in the form of regular 
elections, some competitive institutions and parties existed under 
authoritarian rule. Some of these structures and institutions survived 
precisely because of the logic of democratization and the choices of self-
interested actors.     
As I have alluded sporadically, in El Salvador and Guatemala two very 
different moments structured the process of democratization30. The first 
moment brought the disintegration of the authoritarian alliance and its 
replacement by competitive institutions, such as elections and parties. The 
second moment brought the political inclusion of the long-excluded left and 
established the foundations of the new democratic regime in the peace 
accords. Each moment had it own characteristics and, more importantly, 
was defined by a different distribution of power between the incumbents 
and the opposition. In both countries, despite the differences in the relative 
strength of the incumbents, the regime elites played a much more decisive 
role in the first stage of the transition than in any further stage of the 
process. The influence of regime elites in the first stage of the transition 
helps to explain the continuities that the first electoral legislation exhibited 
with regard to the authoritarian past31. Moreover, given the distributional 
effects of the rules, once established these rules tended to persist, since 
the forces that were in a position to change them were most likley the ones 
that most benefited from them. 
This interpretation, however, still leaves many questions unanswered. 
For example, one could still wonder why more inclusive electoral rules were 
adopted in El Salvador under authoritarian rule, while in Guatemala more 
majoritarian and restrictive institutions dominated. The choice and 
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confirmation of majoritarian rules in the case of Guatemala raises other 
interesting questions, since majoritarian institutions tend to prevail under 
very narrow conditions, and typically not in ethnically divided societies32.  
From a strategic perspective, majoritarian institutions typically prevail 
when: a) the incumbents dominate the transition and are able to impose the 
conditions of change on the other side; and b) the incumbents and/or their 
civilian allies are optimistic about their electoral chances. In Guatemala, the 
first condition clearly was met: the incumbents, and more particularly the 
military, controlled the first transition, up to the first democratic elections, 
from the beginning to the end and were able to impose the conditions of 
change on the civilian forces. The second condition, however, is not so 
self-evident if I take into account that the first democratic elections to 
choose a Constitutional Assembly gave no party a dominant position on 
which to base an optimistic electoral calculus. In spite of this, the parties in 
the assembly chose to confirm the majoritarian institutions inherited from 
the authoritarian regime instead of switching to a more pluralistic 
institutional scheme.  
Several possible explanations might account for this. The first 
explanation assumes that, despite the results, the incumbent parties had 
relatively high electoral expectations. This supposition is based on two 
additional pieces of information. First, although no party alone obtained 
more than 25 percent of the electoral vote and parliamentary 
representation, the incumbent parties (the MLN/CAN and the PID) together 
controlled a plurality of the electoral vote and seats. Moreover, adding the 
votes and seats obtained by the closest ideological party, the UCN, the 
incumbent parties controlled a majority in the assembly. If I add the fact 
that the timing of the elections to choose the first democratic president and 
legislature tended to favor the incumbent parties (since it was close in time 
to the first elections), it might be understood why the incumbent parties had 
optimistic electoral expectations. The absolute majority obtained by the 
opposition party, the DCG, in the 1985 elections proved how weakly based 
these expectations were.     
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An alternative explanation to the confirmation of more majoritarian 
institutions by the democratic forces in Guatemala would support Shuggart 
and Carey’s argument regarding the strong relationship between weak 
parties and strong presidencies. Interviews with the leaders of some of the 
parties represented in the Constitutional Assembly and the high 
fragmentation and volatility characterizing Guatemala’s party system would 
support this hypothesis. The Guatemalan case also would support the 
evidence found in Eastern Europe regarding the strong relationship 
between weak parties and strong political leaders and the choice of 
majoritarian institutions. 
Finally, the choice of majoritarian institutions in the Guatemalan case 
casts some doubt on Lijphart’s argument concerning the influence of 
ethnically divided societies in the choice of more pluralistic institutions. 
Guatemala stands as a counter-example because with a percentage of 
indigenous people representing around the 40 percent of the population, it 
has one of the most majoritarian institutional schemes in all of Central 
America. 
In the case of El Salvador, the confirmation of more inclusive and 
pluralistic institutions in the first stage of the transition (1980-1982) was 
only reinforced by the logic of democratization and the mode of transition. 
For example, while some essential features of the electoral system –such 
as the LR-Hare formula and the size of the lowest districts– were fixed in 
the 1983 Constitutions and later in the 1988 Electoral Code, the 
participation of the left in the 1991 legislative and local elections led to 
significant changes –such as increasing the number of representatives and 
introducing a national district– that increased the proportionality of the 
electoral system. These rules were later confirmed in the peace 
negotiations.  
The pluralism of the Salvadoran institutional system, however, cannot 
be completely explained by the transition mode –or for the matter by the 
specificities structuring the point of departure. Once established, institutions 
tend to persist because the only actors in a position to change them are 
those most likely to benefit from them33. This point, which emphasizes the 
 31
self-reinforcing nature of institutions, has been made even more forcefully 
for pluralistic institutions than for majoritarian ones. By their win-win nature, 
pluralistic institutions are expected to gather the support of a larger number 
of actors than the more restrictive, win-lose majoritarian institutions. The 
Salvadoran case provides a good illustration of how self-reinforcing 
pluralism may work to deepen the pluralistic character of the institutions, 
and of how the forces unleashed by a pluralistic institutional scheme tend 
to work to deepen the pluralism of the institutions.  
Conclusions 
In this paper I have compared institutional outcomes in El Salvador 
and Guatemala and argued that the transition modes in each country 
helped to shape these different institutional outcomes. In general, the 
modes of transition helped to shape the following outcomes: Where the 
transition was military-controlled and “from above”, as in Guatemala, civil-
military relations turned out to be more unbalanced and more majoritarian 
political institutions prevailed. Conversely, where the civilian forces played 
a more important role and the transition was negotiated, as in El Salvador, 
more balanced civil-military relations emerged and more pluralistic 
institutions resulted.  
We have been careful to argue, however, that all the institutional 
choices considered in this paper were the direct outcome of the transition 
modes. In fact, in at least half of the outcomes, including certain features of 
the electoral system and some characteristics of the institutional schemes, 
continuity played a prominent role in the institutional choices. These 
institutional continuities, as I have also argued, do not call into question, but 
rather are embedded in, the explanations emphasizing the logic of 
democratization and the choice of self-interested actors. Nor, however, can 
they be explained by a static category such as the transition mode. Instead, 
the continuities can be captured only by breaking down the process into 
different moments and recognizing the changes affecting the relative 
bargaining power of the different forces at different points along the 
process.   
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The comparison between these two cases provides the following 
lessons about the processes of democratization and institutional outcomes 
in Central America. First, democratization has not moved these countries 
away from their differences and set them on a path of political 
convergence, as some authors like to believe. Instead, these cases 
suggest that democratization marks a new turning point in an increasingly 
divergent institutional path. This paper shows that Guatemala and El 
Salvador, two countries that shared many similarities before their 
transitions, not only are growing increasingly apart, politically and 
institutionally, but also that, given the similarities between them, a good 
part of this institutional divergence stems from the specific way in which 
each one made its transition to democracy.  
The second lesson tends to confirm the conventional wisdom about 
institutional change. The example of these countries shows that 1) once 
established, institutions tend to persist, and 2) institutional persistence is 
independent of the character of the institutions, since it applies to both 
majoritarian and pluralistic institutions. Although by this I do not mean that 
no institutional change has been attempted and carried out in these 
countries, I do mean that changes always have tended to move in the 
direction of reinforcing the actual majoritarian or pluralistic character of 
institutions.  
Finally, these cases help to illustrate the political effects associated 
with different institutional schemes. Although this subject cannot be 
developed further here, at least a few general comments can be made to 
illustrate the point. If I take, for example, three relevant dimensions of policy 
–such as the level of political conflict, the continuity of policy and the 
stability in the rules– I find that important differences separate El Salvador 
and Guatemala in these dimensions. In general, in El Salvador, the level of 
conflict has been lower, the policies have enjoyed greater continuity, and 
the rules have tended to be more stable. In contrast, in Guatemala, the 
level of conflict has tended to increase with each election, the policies have 
grown more discontinuous, and greater instability has affected the rules. All 
of these differences may well be the result of the countries’ different 
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institutional schemes. In this sense, it is plausible to think that more 
inclusive and pluralistic institutions have contributed to a lower level of 
conflict (and a higher level of compromise); a greater continuity in policy; 
and a greater institutional stability that has lasted for years after the 
transition. Conversely, the winner-take-all character of Guatemalan 
institutions probably has helped to increase the level of conflict and political 
confrontation in each election as well as to create greater discontinuity in 
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